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ABSTRACT 
The EU enlargement process and its consequences are decisively influenced by material national interests 
and state power. Current EU leaders promote accession primarily because they believe it to be in their long-
term economic and geopolitical interest, and applicant states embark on the laborious accession process be-
cause EU membership brings tremendous economic and geopolitical benefits, particularly as compared ex-
clusion as others move forward. As in previous rounds of EU enlargement, patterns of asymmetrical inter-
dependence dictate that the applicants compromise more on the margin—thereby contributing to a subjec-
tive sense of loss among those countries (the applicants) that benefit most. Domestic distributional conflict 
is exacerbated everywhere, but the losses are in most cases limited, inevitable and, in the longer term, even 
beneficial. Once in, we should expect applicant states, like their predecessors, to deploy their voting and 
veto power in an effort to transfer resources to themselves. While overrepresentation of smaller states gives 
the applicants an impressive number of votes, the lack of new “grand projects” essential to existing mem-
bers, the diversity of the new members, and above all, the increasingly flexible decision-making structure 
of the EU, will make it difficult for the new members to prevail.   2
  Some fifteen years after the collapse of communism, the uniting of Western and 
Eastern Europe through a substantial enlargement of the EU is perhaps the most impor-
tant single policy instrument available to further a more stable and prosperous continent.
1 
As many as eight post-communist states are poised to conclude negotiations with the EU 
for full membership by the end of 2002. In this essay we seek to outline in the very 
broadest strokes the most important structural forces of national interest and influence un-
derlying the dynamics of enlargement itself and its future consequences for EU govern-
ance. We do not claim our analysis is comprehensive, only that it seeks to capture the 
most significant of the underlying forces in play. 
The apparent success of enlargement and the terms on which it is taking place 
have surprised many analysts and aroused many critics. Most commentators treat enlarge-
ment as a radical break in the history of the EU. They find the prospect of enlargement 
itself mystifying and invoke import idealistic motivations on the part of European gov-
ernments to explain it. At the same time, many criticize the EU for taking too long to en-
large and for imposing burdensome conditions for doing so. Still others fear that enlarge-
ment without substantial federalizing reform will lead to gridlock and crisis.  
In this essay we challenge each of these conventional presuppositions. The EU 
enlargement process and its likely consequences for the future are hardly mysterious 
when viewed from the perspective of national interests and state power–and this view-
point also offers a more optimistic prognosis for the future. Just as occurred in the past, 
EU leaders promote accession because they consider enlargement to be in their long-term 
                                                 
1 This is a speculative claim, of course. For the case, see: Timothy Garton Ash, “Europe’s Endangered 
Liberal Order,” Foreign Affairs 77,2 (March/April 1998): 51-65; Andrew Moravcsik, “The Quiet Super-
power,” Newsweek, 17 June 2002; Milada Anna Vachudova, “The EU Needs to Change Its Spots,” The 
International Herald Tribune, 8 August 1999.   3
economic and geopolitical interest. While some interest groups in current member states 
are opposed to enlargement because they will bear a disproportionate share of the short-
term costs, the EU bargaining process is working this out much as it has prior conflicts 
about the uneven distribution of the costs of integration projects that are beneficial over-
all. East European states take part in the laborious accession process because EU mem-
bership brings tremendous economic and geopolitical benefits–particularly as compared 
to the uncertain and potentially catastrophic costs of being left behind as others move for-
ward. While the candidates have had to comply with the EU’s requirements and acqui-
esce to certain unfavorable terms, EU membership has remained a matter of net national 
interest. On balance, the sacrifices demanded of them seem entirely in keeping with the 
immense adjustment, and the immense benefits, involved. Most of the conditions have 
motivated East European governments to implement reforms that improve the state and 
increase aggregate economic welfare.  
Looking forward to the consequences of enlargement, we find little reason to pre-
dict that enlargement will cause the gridlock of EU institutions, or significantly change 
the course of European integration. The applicant countries are numerous, backward and 
diverse–and indeed their bargaining power will increase once they are members. Yet as 
they are absorbed into the EU’s decision-making process, new members are likely to do 
little more than mildly reinforce existing trends in EU politics, such as growing conflict 
over the budget and increasing cooperation outside of the first pillar. 
 
 
   4
I. Negotiating Enlargement 
Each previous round of EU enlargement has gone through a parallel and predict-
able negotiation process. In these rounds, applicant countries have consistently found 
themselves in a weak negotiating position vis-à-vis their EU partners, and accordingly 
have conceded much in exchange for membership.  
To see why, it is helpful to introduce a few insights from basic bargaining theory. 
Relative bargaining power in international negotiations tends to track relative preference 
intensity.
2  The logic is simple: those countries that gain the most through more intense 
interstate cooperation–more precisely, those for whom cooperation is most attractive   
relative to unilateral (or mini-lateral) policymaking–have the most intense preferences for 
agreement and thus are willing to compromise the most on the margin to further it. In the 
language of international relations theory, interstate bargaining outcomes reflect patterns 
of “asymmetrical interdependence”–more “interdependent” countries tend to benefit 
more from liberalizing markets, and are thus willing to make concessions to do so. With-
in the EU, such beneficiaries tend to be (all other things equal) those countries that are 
smallest in GNP terms, for which the increased economies of scale of entering the Euro-
pean market are of greatest marginal significance. The existence of distinct comparative 
advantages in relevant export sectors further shapes their specific interests.
3  Once the 
back and forth of negotiation is complete, the subjective sense for such countries is often 
of having bargained poorly, because they are forced to make disproportionate conces-
                                                 
2 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little Brown, 1977). 
3 This is distinct, of course, from the classic realist focus on the use of overall “capabilities” to back credi-
ble threats of costly coercion (e.g. sanctions, military force), which are simply not credible in the EU con-
text.
 Coercive bargaining of this type is essentially unknown in the EU. For an otherwise insightful analysis 
that conflates these two processes, see Lloyd Gruber, Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of 
Supranational Institutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).   5
sions during the negotiations. Yet this is a function of the large overall net benefit to them, 
which also compel ratification and implementation of the resulting agreement.
4 
The negotiation of the original Treaty of Rome during the mid-1950s offers a 
striking example. As the logic above would predict, the country whose foreign minister 
had initially proposed the customs union and which benefited the most per capita from its 
realization–namely the Netherlands–was forced to make the greatest concessions on the 
margin to achieve agreement. The result was that the Treaty was viciously criticized by 
Dutch politicians and the public–more so, perhaps, than in any other of the six original 
member states, even though (or precisely because) non-ratification by the Netherlands 
was never a realistic option.
5  The obverse case in the 1950s was that of France, which 
achieved almost all of its negotiating goals in large part because, as a large and macro-
economically uncompetitive country, French non-ratification was a realistic possibility up 
until the final moment.
6  Add to these structural economic realities a general German ten-
dency to be somewhat more forthcoming in order to cement geopolitical alliances–a con-
stant of European integration until, and beyond, 1989–and the bargaining outcomes are 
precisely what one would expect.
7 
The same pattern has characterized EU bargaining ever since: specific interstate 
concessions and compromises tend to reflect the priorities of the EU’s core countries, and 
                                                 
4 On the theory as applied to the EU, see Andrew Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single European Act: Na-
tional Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community." International Organization 45,1 
(Winter 1991): 19-56, and Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power 
from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), Chapter One. 
5 Richard Griffiths, “Die Benelux-Staaten und die Schumanplan-Verhandlungen,” in  L. Herbst, W. Bührer 
and H. e. Sowade, eds. Vom Marshallplan zur EWG. Die Eingliederung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in 
die westliche Welt (München, Oldenbourg, 1990), pp. 263-278. 
6 Alan S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (London, Routledge, 1993); Moravcsik, The 
Choice for Europe. 
7 Andrew Moravcsik and Kalypso Nicolaïdis, "Negotiating the Treaty of Amsterdam: Interests, Influence, 
Institutions," Journal of Common Market Studies  37,1 (March 1999): 59-85. On the interrelationship be-
tween economic and geopolitical goals, see Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, pp. 472-501.    6
disproportionately the most powerful among them, even as more peripheral countries 
benefit as much or more overall.
8  Enlargement negotiations with Britain, Ireland, Den-
mark, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Finland and Austria track this pattern.
9  In each 
case, bargaining demands by applicant countries for recognition of their particular cir-
cumstances were stripped away one by one until a deal was struck that disproportionately 
reflected the priorities of existing member states. Thus Britain in 1973, though relatively 
poor, ended up a large net contributor to the EU budget. Ireland, Denmark, Greece, and 
Spain were subsequently forced to accept agricultural arrangements not particularly well 
suited to their particular comparative advantages, and often involving lengthy transition 
periods. In the 1990s, the enlargement to include Sweden, Finland and Austria imposed 
full membership on countries that initially sought greater market access in the context of 
a less comprehensive commitment. 
So it is, and is likely to remain, with the current applicants from Central and East-
ern Europe. EU member states and the eastern applicants will both benefit from EU en-
largement, but the applicants will benefit more. The basic asymmetry of interdependence 
and thus power is evident from the simple fact that the collective GDP of the next ten ap-
plicants for membership totals no more than 3-5 percent that of the current EU-15–less 
than any other major enlargement of the EU.
10  This is roughly the weight of Mexico’s 
economy as compared to that of the United States.   
 
                                                 
8 Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe. 
9 For a consistent analysis, see Walter Mattli, The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
10 Greece, which entered alone under unusual circumstances, is an exception.   7
 
 
Since 1990, the political consequences of this fundamental asymmetry have been 
evident.
11  They are clearest in the form of the pre-accession process, in which applicants 
must satisfy the Copenhagen criteria and adopt the acquis in its entirety to qualify for 
membership.
12  Until recently, the negotiations have been little more than a process of 
checking that the candidates have adopted EU law, chapter by chapter and page by page. 
The requirements are massive, non-negotiable, uniformly applied, and closely enforced. 
The transition from communism has meant not only building a market economy from the 
ground up, but also creating a modern regulatory state capable of implementing the EU’s 
acquis, now far more substantial than during any previous wave of enlargement. This it-
self imposes a heavy burden in the sense that the EU compels new applicants to transpose 
and implement standards of internal democracy, state administration and detailed regu-
latory protection that the EU-15 have had a half century to accommodate. It also imposes 
                                                 
11  Milada Anna Vachudova, “The Leverage of International Institutions on Democratizing States: The 
European Union and Eastern Europe,” RSCAS Working Paper No. 2001/33 (Fiesole: European University 
Institute, 2001). 
12 The association agreements signed in the early 1990s were a start. They imposed long transition periods 
for the phase-out of trade barriers in precisely those sectors where the East Europeans had something to 
export but the EU had powerful interest groups to protect: steel, textiles, chemicals and agriculture. For an 
overview of the EU’s policy toward the East, see Ulrich Sedelmeier and Helen Wallace, “Eastern Enlarge-
ment: Strategy or Second Thoughts?” in Helen Wallace and William Wallace, eds., Policy Making in the 
European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 427-461. 
Round of Enlargement 
GNP of applicants/ 
GNP of existing 
members 
GNP per capita of 
applicants/GNP of 
existing members 
1
st Enlargement (1973):  UK, IRE, DK  20% 79% 
2
nd Enlargement (1981):  G  2% 48% 
3
rd Enlargement (1986):  ES, P  7% 42% 
4
th Enlargement (1995):  S, SF, A  8% 115% 
5
th Enlargement (2000+): 
PO, H, CZ, SL, ES  3% 20% 
5
th Enlargement (2000+):  PO, H, CZ, 
SK, SL, BU, RO, LA, LI, ES, MAL, CYP 5% 14%   8
a double standard in a handful of areas, chiefly the protection of ethnic minority rights, 
where candidates are asked to meet standards that the EU-15 have never set for them-
selves. Some EU rules even seem ill-considered, unsuited to transitional economies, or 
ill-suited for particular countries. The intrusive verification procedures that follow these 
standards are a tough blow for national pride.  
Yet for the construction of a well-functioning market economy and a strong, de-
mocratic state–long-term goals that are hardly in question–the requirements for EU mem-
bership have been, on balance, positive.
13  They have promoted valuable reforms: creat-
ing an independent civil service, overhauling the judiciary, improving oversight of finan-
cial markets, and blocking bail-outs of uncompetitive but influential sectors. To be sure, 
applicants have had to divert their meager public resources from health and education to 
implementing an acquis devoted primarily to the regulation of economic production. Still, 
locking the applicants into the EU legal and regulatory frameworks promises to limit cor-
ruption, improve administrative capacity and, most importantly perhaps, attract foreign 
investment and facilitating full insertion into the EU and global economy–thereby 
bringing substantial returns to the national budget over the long run. Entering the EU is 
expected to raise output and growth rates by stimulating entrepreneurship, foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and technology transfers.
14  Studies indicate that because of raised in-
vestor confidence FDI inflows have been concentrated in those post-communist states that 
                                                 
13 Vachudova, “The Leverage of International Institutions,” pp. 8-12. 
14 Heather Grabbe, Profiting from EU Enlargement (London: Centre for European Reform, 2001).   9
are on track to join the EU.
 15  One study forecasts long-term total gains to the new mem-
ber states ranging from 23 billion to 50 billion Euro.
16   
The economic reforms demanded by the EU, including the withdrawal of the state 
from many areas of the economy, do impose a large adjustment cost on economically and 
politically vulnerable countries. Applicants have had to expose industry to competition 
from Western firms, sharply decrease state subsidies to weak sectors, and privatize rela-
tively quickly large enterprises, banks and state utilities. Yet many of these reforms are 
an integral part of completing the transition to market capitalism and attracting foreign 
investment, particularly on the European continent. The absence of EU pressure might 
well mean much greater rent-seeking by elites in control of “gradual” reforms.
17  Twelve 
years on, the evidence is indisputable that the EU frontrunners that have reformed the 
most rapidly have also registered the highest rates of economic growth, and suffered the 
lowest increase in income inequality–as compared to their eastern and southeastern 
neighbors that opted for more gradual reforms after 1989.
18  
In recent years, it must be conceded, the EU has also imposed some more nar-
rowly self-interested conditions. These are in precisely those areas where advanced in-
dustrial democracies have customarily crafted such exceptions, not just within the EU, 
but within the GATT and WTO as well. Not only have the applicants been compelled to ac-
                                                 
15 Bartlomiej Kaminski, “How Accession to the European Union has Affected External Trade and Foreign 
Direct Investment in Central European Economies,” Policy Research Paper 2578 (Washington DC: The 
World Bank, 2001). 
16 Richard E. Baldwin, Joseph F. Francois, and Richard Portes, “The Costs and Benefits of Eastern Enlarge-
ment: The Impact on the EU and Central Europe,” Economic Policy 24 (1997): 125-76. 
17 Vachudova, “The Leverage of International Institutions,” pp. 23-30. 
18 Joel S. Hellman, “Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions,” 
World Politics 50,1 (January 1998): 203-34. See also Milada Anna Vachudova and Tim Snyder, "Are Tran-
sitions Transitory? Two Models of Political Change in East Central Europe Since 1989," East European 
Politics and Societies 11,1 (Winter 1997): 1-35; and The World Bank, Transition The First Ten Years: 
Analysis and Lessons for Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (Washington DC: The World Bank, 
2002).   10
cept EU standards, but they are also now being forced to accept unfavorable terms for 
their accession–to sacrifice some portion of the benefits of membership over the short 
and medium term. They will receive lower (albeit still substantial) subsidies from the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and from the Structural and Cohesion Funds than did 
the previous poorer applicants. Outlays from the EU budget to new members have been 
capped at 4 percent of their GDP, although the latter is far lower than their predecessors. 
This effectively limits their receipts and protects those of the richer existing members.
19  
The applicants will also have to accept special provisions related to some areas of Euro-
pean integration, including long transition periods for certain benefits such as the free 
movement of labor and equal access to the EU’s agricultural subsidies. Many of the spe-
cial provisions reflect the demands of narrow special interests or the concerns of voting 
publics in the existing members.  
Many view these unfavorable terms of accession as prima facie unreasonable, but 
the logic of bargaining outlined above suggests a more nuanced conclusion. The appli-
cants are forced into concessions precisely because the basic benefit offered to them–
membership–is of such great value. This benefit so outweighs the costs–particularly those 
of exclusion–that applicants make concessions even when no coercion is threatened. Such 
is the logic of “asymmetrical interdependence.” 
The greatest puzzle posed by enlargement is thus not why the accession countries 
are so anxious to enter, but why the existing EU-15 are willing to let them in. Here, too, 
the final tally of enlargement’s costs and benefits is the subject of considerable debate. 
Frank Schimmelfennig has argued that economic and geopolitical interests cannot ac-
count for the EU’s decision to embark on such an ambitious and costly enlargement. In-
                                                 
19 Grabbe, Profiting from EU Enlargement, p. 36.   11
stead, confronted by the power of norm-based arguments, the West talked itself into a 
commitment to admit countries that share its liberal values–and this “rhetorical entrap-
ment” has subsequently sustained enlargement despite the fact that mere association for 
East European states would have better served the EU’s interests.
20 
Scholars who consider EU enlargement as a triumph of supranational entrepre-
neurship or of norms over interests point to the costs of making East European states full 
members as opposed to mere associate members. While there is no doubt that a measure 
of idealism played a supporting role in the decision to enlarge, the “rhetorical” account of 
enlargement must be placed in proper perspective.  
First, the overall effect of enlargement is modest. The ten new members, we have 
seen, represent less than 5 percent of the current EU GDP and thus can have relatively lit-
tle impact. It is easier to indulge rhetorical idealism, if this is what occurred, when the 
impact is marginal.  
Second, however modest, there are significant material benefits to the EU-15. The 
candidate countries will add 100 million new consumers in relatively fast-growing econo-
mies to the internal market. One study projects that the EU-15 countries will gain about 
ten billion euro from enlargement over the long term, well more than the cost to the EU 
                                                 
20 Frank Schimmelfennig, “The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern En-
largement of the European Union,” International Organization 55,1 (Winter 2001): 47-80. See also Rachel 
Epstein, “International Institutions and the Depoliticization of Economic policy,” (Paper presented at the 
ECPR Workshop “Enlargement and European Governance’ ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Turin, 22-27 
March 2002). From an empirical perspective, Schimmelfennig’s argument is intriguing. Like many empiri-
cal analyses based on norm-based arguments in the field of international relations today, however, it does 
not distinguish two situations–one in which the promulgation of norms causes subsequent norm-
conforming behavior and another in which long-term structural factors cause both the initial promulgation 
of the norm and the subsequent behavior. Arguments like Schimmelfennig rest, therefore, to a precarious 
extent on the hypothetical counterfactual that alternative policies would have better served the “national 
interest” of West European governments. The empirical analysis of this episode therefore remains open.   12
budget of having the new members.
21  Perhaps more important, the geopolitical stabiliza-
tion and economic revitalization of the European borderlands is likely to dampen nation-
alist conflict and make illegal immigration more manageable.
22  Some believe that the EU 
will thereby gain greater clout as a geopolitical actor. It is easy to indulge rhetorical ideal-
ism when measurable economic and geopolitical benefits are in play.  
Third, these benefits come at more limited cost to the EU-15 than some initially 
expected–though, of course, some member-states and interest groups do bear a dispropor-
tionate share of those costs. Industrial trade, for example, has already been largely lib-
eralized with little disruption to the EU’s sensitive sectors such as steel and textiles. The 
safeguard measures allowed for EU producers under the association agreements will thus 
disappear largely unnoticed. Agricultural trade has also been almost fully liberalized with 
few disruptions–indeed, it is the candidates that worry about the dumping of cheap pro-
duce after enlargement. Even for some of the key players that seem to have the most to 
lose, the costs do not outweigh the benefits. Germany, for example, with its high unem-
ployment and proximity to eastern labor, may face adjustment costs in the short term, but 
along with Austria it is predicted to have the highest overall permanent net increase in 
GDP from enlargement.
23  It is easier to engage in rhetorical idealism when the economic 
costs are marginal, or have already been paid. 
There is, of course, the visible and controversial matter of sharing the EU’s ex-
pensive financial transfers with new members. As we have seen, the outcome of discus-
                                                 
21 Baldwin, Francois, and Portes, “The Costs and Benefits of Eastern Enlargement,” pp. 125-76. 
22 The World Bank, The Road to Stability and Prosperity in South Eastern Europe: A Regional Strategy 
Paper (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2000). See also “Democracy, Security and the Future of the 
Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe” (Report by the EastWest Institute and the European Stability 
Initiative, April 2001). 
23 This argument is developed in Milada Anna Vachudova, “EU Enlargement: An Overview,” East Euro-
pean Constitutional Review 9,4 (2000): 64-69.   13
sions on how to apportion monies from the EU’s Structural and Cohesion Funds, and 
from the Common Agricultural Policy between old and new members is almost certain to 
come largely at the expense of the candidates, whose poor regions and poor farmers will 
have to accept a phase in of transfer payments.
24  The EU will hammer out a compromise 
between recipients, contributors, and reformers, much as it has in past rounds of enlarge-
ment. To be sure, there will also be losers among traditional beneficiaries of the CAP in 
Western Europe. But here the pressure of enlargement dovetails with the long-standing 
trend (powered by the fierce desire of several existing EU members and the EU’s trading 
partners) toward CAP reform–a trend that reflects, ultimately, the declining number of 
farmers in Western Europe and renewed pressure from net contributor countries like Ger-
many.
25  
  As with the accession countries, the highest costs among the EU-15 may be politi-
cal rather than economic. Enlargement is unpopular with EU voters, many of whom asso-
ciate it with rising illegal immigration, international crime, and unemployment. While 
there is little evidence that enlargement will contribute measurably to any of these prob-
lems (to the contrary!), EU politicians have nonetheless had to satisfy restive publics. In 
the short-term, the asymmetry of power between the EU and the candidates in the acces-
sion process has made such accommodation relatively easy: new members will be kept 
out of Schengen for many years; they will be required to reinforce their borders; and they 
                                                 
24 A scenario like that of Britain in 1975, which might afford the candidates some extra bargaining leverage, 
cannot be excluded. In absolute terms, even if they are better off getting into the EU in 2004 with new 
member farmers getting much lower payments, Poland in particular warns that in these circumstances the 
referendum on entering the EU may not pass. See Milada Anna Vachudova, “The Trump Card of Domestic 
Politics: Bargaining Over EU Enlargement,” East European Constitutional Review 10, 2 (2001): 93-97. 
25 The most recent Eurobarometer polls show that the old policy areas of agriculture and regional funds are 
of little interest to most voters. See Heather Grabbe, “The governance of the EU: Facing the challenge of 
enlargement,” New Economy 9,2 (June 2002): 114.    14
will wait for seven years after accession before their citizens enjoy the right–at least in 
the abstract–to live and work anywhere in the EU. Before the decade is out, the issue may 
disappear as stagnant population growth in the EU is likely to leave old members scram-
bling to attract workers from the new members or third countries. 
Overall, there is little reason to believe that enlargement runs, overall, counter to 
the interests of either existing or new members. Each is acting in response to structural 
imperatives predicted by basic bargaining theory and revealed in the behavior of their EU 
predecessors. 
 
II. Consequences for the Applicant Countries 
 
  This is not, however, the end of the story. Once in, new EU members have tended 
to do substantially better for themselves, primarily because they can work more effec-
tively within formal decision-making rules to promote their interests. Membership effec-
tively reverses the power relationship between core and peripheral members of the EU. 
The broad trend in EU politics over the next two decades is likely to be heavily influ-
enced by this shifting balance of power. 
Again, basic bargaining theory provides an instructive guide. EU members can 
enact treaty change only by unanimity. In any such exercise, therefore, each EU member 
wields substantial bargaining power vis-à-vis their EU partners. While each is formally 
equal, the precise distribution of bargaining power depends on patterns of asymmetrical 
interdependence. Specifically, it reflects the extent to which various countries favor new 
reforms. (Here the threat of expulsion from the EU has but a fraction of the credibility of 
the threat of exclusion from joining at all.) Typically the core members and the richer 
countries have proposed and most intensely favored new initiatives (e.g. the Single Euro-  15
pean Act, the single currency, strong regulatory protection, a common policy on immi-
gration, foreign policy cooperation), thereby casting the newer and poorer member states 
in the role of effective veto players. Small-country veto players, not least new members, 
are therefore likely to find themselves in a far more advantageous position. The result, 
theory predicts and history confirms, is likely to be a series of concessions and side-
payments from core countries in exchange for the support of others. 
Over the years, this power has been wielded by successive applicants in different 
ways, but with broadly similar consequences. In 1975, two years after the Tory govern-
ment under  Edward Heath had negotiated British entry–on terms so strikingly unfavor-
able that Britain, though never a wealthy country by per capita EU standards, has been a 
net contributor to the EU budget ever since–a Labour government under Harold Wilson 
government called for a referendum. Afraid that the British would vote no, thereby em-
barrassing the entire institution and triggering a wholesale renegotiation, the French and 
Germans established a system of regional funding that transferred substantial resources to 
Britain. Public-spirited justifications were later concocted, but Helmut Schmidt was more 
brutally honest when he referred to regional policy as a bribe covered only by "swimming 
trunks with "regional policy" written on them."
26  In successive waves of negotiation, the 
Greeks, Spanish, Portuguese, and Irish benefited in similar ways.
27  The “Club Med” 
countries threatened to block various initiatives–the Single European Act, the Maastricht 
Treaty–unless financial transfers were upped. The result was the construction of a set of 
international financial transfers on a scale unknown since the Marshall Plan. At their 
height, structural funds accounted for 8 percent of Portuguese GDP.  
                                                 
26 Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, p. 258. 
27 For one speculation about the nature of the linkages, Peter Lange, "Maastricht and the Social Protocol: 
Why Did They Do It?" Politics and Society 21,1 (1993): 5-36.   16
  There is every reason to believe that the bargaining power of the eastern candi-
dates will similarly improve once they become full members, and there is little reason to 
doubt that they will use it. Indeed, the veto threat is in many ways likely to be greater 
than in the past. The next twelve prospective new members are highly diverse, but they 
are also numerous and  almost certain to agree that any financial advantages old members 
enjoy over them should be reversed. If they join forces, they will collectively have the 
ability to block unanimous votes, such as those on budgetary matters. Given that it will 
be difficult for the EU to settle the budget for 2007 onwards prior to enlargement, the 
candidates will already be full members by the time the EU starts the next epic round of 
budgetary negotiations. Moreover, they will also be able to block votes by Qualified Ma-
jority (108/345 = 31 percent) in a quite unprecedented fashion–a reflection of the radical 
overrepresentation of smaller countries in the EU system. The long transition periods and 
unequal benefits currently being imposed on the applicant countries have instructed them 
that only by playing tough in EU bargaining can they get a better deal, just as they 
learned in the 1990s that only full membership would give them full access to the EU 
market. For all these reasons, new members are nearly certain to deploy their voting pow-
er in an effort to secure a greater share of EU spending. In the next section we consider to 
what extent they will succeed. 
 
 
III. Consequences for the European Union as a Whole 
 
The conventional view is that the increase in the number of member states and the 
greater diversity of their views will not only create pressure for financial transfers, but 
will cause a breakdown or gridlock in the EU’s decision-making process. The proper an-  17
swer, many maintain, is more qualified majority voting (QMV).
28  While the precise level 
of transfer payments is difficult to predict, we argue in this section that wholesale pessi-
mism about the viability of EU decision-making with up to twenty-seven diverse mem-
bers is greatly exaggerated. 
Diversity of interest, not the number of members per se, is the real issue. To be 
sure, some believe that the threat of gridlock increases with the number of actors because 
the threat comes from the random likelihood of an individual veto under unanimity, 
which increases exponentially as the EU enlarges.
29  Yet–the cases of Thatcher’s Britain 
under agricultural subsidies, Greece over Macedonia, and the Irish referendum notwith-
standing–the binding constraint on EU policymaking is not generally imposed by indi-
vidual vetoes. Instead, it is imposed by the level of conflict of interest among blocks of 
states. 
The real threat, therefore, would have to come from the increasing diversity of EU 
member state interests after enlargement, and the emergence of an effective block of new 
states.
30  This is widely viewed as a threat to the functioning of the EU primarily because 
new members are unlikely to support great strides forward in European integration. This 
is plausible. Even after joining in 2004, they will be working to satisfy the requirements 
for membership in Schengen and in the EMU, and will hardly be on the lookout for more 
                                                 
28 Even though, as we have just seen, this would not be enough to avoid a concerted effort by new members 
to hold up legislation. 
29 Interview with Michel Petite, 1998. This argument recurs in many Commission publications. For the po-
litical science orthodoxy on numbers, see Kenneth A. Oye, “Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypo-
theses and Strategies,” in Oye, ed. Cooperation under Anarchy. (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
1986), pp. 1-23. This argument, following the institutionalist paradigm, assumes high transaction costs. For 
the empirical evidence supporting an opposing (low transaction cost) assessment of EU treaty amendment, 
one more consistent with this analysis of enlargement, see Andrew Moravcsik, "A New Statecraft? Supra-
national Entrepreneurship and Interstate Cooperation," International Organization 53,2 (Spring 1999): 267-
306.  
30 This argument is addressed in more detail in Andrew Moravcsik, “Europe's Integration at Century's 
End,” in Moravcsik, ed., Centralization or Fragmentation? Europe Facing the Challenges of Deepening, 
Diversity, and Democracy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1998), pp. 1-58.     18
to do. None, moreover, are particularly enamored with the EU’s supranational institutions. 
Euroskepticism is rising among applicant countries that have endured pressure for un-
popular concessions in the negotiations, and that have received stiff report cards from the 
Commission every autumn for almost a decade.
31  
Yet this is unlikely to cause a logjam, let alone threaten the current achievements 
of the EU, for three reasons. 
First, the new members are not all that unruly. Budgetary policy aside, there is lit-
tle evidence that they will import divergent or destabilizing policy agendas into the EU. 
On most issues they will instead join existing coalitions. This of course means that cer-
tain voting coalitions will be strengthened. In some areas, such as immigration, new 
members and old members tend to see eye to eye: keeping foreigners out is popular, east 
and west.
32  Elsewhere may be some fascinating twists and turns. Poland may turn out to 
be France’s greatest nemesis in the competition for agricultural subsidies, but after entry 
Poland could presumably also be France’s staunchest ally in preserving a generous CAP. 
At most this would mean a slow-down in further integration, not a threat to the existing 
acquis, however, since most existing EU policies are deeply enough embedded both in 
the laws and societies of the member states so as to be effectively irreversible.
33 
                                                 
31 In the past, small states have often voted their self-interest and supported the Commission against the 
Council, because larger states can more easily dominate the Council. Two circumstances are different: (1) 
Commission positions may now be less consistent with the interests of the new members than they were 
with the interests of the Benelux countries in the early years. (2) The relative attractiveness of the Com-
mission as an advocate may decline as the number of smaller, poorer states in the Council increases. 
32 The notable exception is Poland, which has kept a remarkably open eastern border, and which is being 
forced to close that border as a condition of EU membership. Overall, however, the balance is difficult to 
draw, since little work has been done on how new members may alter the existing balance of power, par-
ticularly on issues where decisions are taken by QMV.  
33 An exception is agricultural policy, where substantive policy goals will eventually dictate reform. Yet 
even this natural retrenchment is difficult to engineer.   19
Second and more fundamental, member states have no consensual “grand project” 
for European integration that could easily be stalled by the vetoes of unruly new members 
seeking budgetary side payments. This has been the lesson of three successive treaty 
amendment exercises. Nor would it be easy for new members to employ their voting 
power in QMV to block legislation, since the internal market is largely complete and legis-
lation moves forward at a slower pace than ten years ago. Today EU governments are in-
stead prioritizing policy areas that lie largely outside of the first pillar, such as foreign 
policy, immigration policy, and monetary policy.
34 
Third, in precisely these areas of current interest outside the first pillar–and some 
within it, flexible institutional mechanisms other than majority voting can be used to 
combat gridlock. In recent years, nearly every major initiative in the EU has involved 
only (or has provisions to involve only) a subset of EU members: EMU, social policy, for-
eign policy, environmental policy, etc. The trend is toward differentiation, flexibility and 
ad hoc arrangements. In many of these areas–foreign policy and flanking policies to EMU 
being prime examples–uniformity is not required for effective policymaking. From the 
perspective of collective action theory, the EU is more about coordinating “coalitions of 
the willing” than avoiding “free riding.” Isolationist new members can sit it out with neu-
tral old members, countries with geographical interest and expertise can work together–
and no harm is done. Finally, and most cynically, member governments no doubt favor 
flexibility, though they do not say so in public, as a means to avoid placing themselves in 
a position where poorer countries can extort financial side-payments. Overall, as Heather 
                                                 
34 EU policymaking on immigration straddles the first and third pillar. See Penelope Turnbull and Wayne 
Sandholtz, “Policing and Immigration: The Creation of New Policy Spaces,” in Alec Stone Sweet, Wayne 
Sandholtz and Neil Fligstein, The Institutionalization of Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 
pp. 194-220.   20
Grabbe has argued, flexibility provides an institutional mechanism to insure greater 
decision-making efficiency when “the ability and willingness of member-states to be in-
tegrated in the EU’s policies …vary much more than in the current Union.”
35 
It is easy to construct scenarios whereby increased diversity will alter the EU’s 
institutions, politics and culture. But few withstand close analysis. In fact, enlargement is 
more likely to reinforce current EU trends toward slower legislative and reform output, 
greater budgetary conflict over structural funding, more pressure to reform the CAP, great-
er “pillarization” of governance, a stronger Council vis-à-vis the Commission, more re-
course to flexibility and coalitions-of-the-willing, a shift in focus from deepening to wid-
ening–and, above all, an emergent “constitutional compromise” in which the policing of 
markets is internationalized but social, cultural, educational, and other  policies remain 
largely national.
36  Die-hard federalists view this compromise as a prima facie sign of 
failure; they have provoked a constitutional convention to re-inspire Europeans to move 
the metaphoric “bicycle” of European integration forward. But it’s not a failure. Instead 
of proving Europe’s constitutional compromise bankrupt, enlargement reveals its matur-
ity and durability. This is true both in the sense that further deepening is no longer neces-
sary to solidify prior reforms, and that widening to include new members, for all of their 
diversity and backwardness, takes place with relative ease and without a major change of 
course. At the same time, the EU will have had a hand in building the most unified, pros-
perous and free European continent in modern history. 
 
                                                 
35 Grabbe, “The governance of the EU,” p. 115. 
36 Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis, “Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam,” pp. 59-85. See also Moravcsik, ed. 
Centralization or Fragmentation? 